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abstract
PURPOSE Informatics solutions to early diagnosis of cancer in primary care are increasingly prevalent, but it is not
clear whether existing and planned standards and regulations sufficiently address patients’ safety nor whether
these standards are fit for purpose. We use a patient safety perspective to reflect on the development of a
computerized cancer risk assessment tool embedded within a UK primary care electronic health record system.
METHODS We developed a computerized version of the CAncer Prevention in ExetER studies risk assessment
tool, in compliance with the European Union’s Medical Device Regulations. The process of building this tool
afforded an opportunity to reflect on clinical concerns and whether current regulations for medical devices are fit
for purpose. We identified concerns for patient safety and developed nine practical recommendations to mitigate
these concerns.
RESULTS We noted that medical device regulations (1) were initially created for hardware devices rather than
software, (2) offer one-shot approval rather than supporting iterative innovation and learning, (3) are biased
toward loss-transfer approaches that attempt to manage the fallout of harm instead of mitigating hazards
becoming harmful, and (4) are biased toward known hazards, despite unknown hazards being an expected
consequence of health care as a complex adaptive system. Our nine recommendations focus on embedding
less-reductionist and stronger system perspectives into regulations and standards.
CONCLUSION Our intention is to share our experience to support research-led collaborative development of health
informatics solutions in cancer. We argue that regulations in the European Union do not sufficiently address the
complexity of healthcare information systems with consequences for patient safety. Future standards and reg-
ulations should continue to follow a system-based approach to risk, safety, and accident avoidance.
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INTRODUCTION
Clinical decision-support tools in primary care can help
clinicians make an early diagnosis of cancer, leading
to better outcomes for the patient and a more effective
use of limited healthcare resources.1 Informatics so-
lutions are increasingly being adopted, but it is not
clear whether existing and planned standards and
regulations sufficiently address patient safety nor
whether these standards are fit for purpose when
embedded within complex and evolving health infor-
mation systems. The patient safety consequences of
rapid development and implementation of such
computerized tools are not yet known. Regulatory
standards have been developed for clinical decision-
support tools in the United States2 and Europe,3 but it
is not clear whether these sufficiently address patient
safety. This paper presents a case study in clinical
cancer informatics to reflect on whether current
standards are fit for purpose.
Survival rates are better for early-stage diagnoses
across many cancers, and early diagnosis is recog-
nized as a key determinant of improved outcomes.4-7
Early diagnosis in primary care can be challenging
wheremultiple vague symptomsmight be reported.8 In
the United Kingdom, primary care General Practi-
tioners (GPs) sometimes delay referral for cancer
investigation9 and some GPs require high levels of
suspicion before referring.10 In an effort to minimize
delay,11 clinical decision-support tools and systems
can assist GPs to expedite referrals and contribute to
earlier diagnosis by recommending an appropriate
diagnostic pathway.1
There are many kinds of decision support with mixed
evidence of effectiveness.12-14 Symptom checker
applications can be used to prompt patients15 who
might otherwise delay a referral because they have
trivialized symptoms.16 Symptoms lacking objective
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not always considered with due weight because they are
often common and nonspecific, despite being strongly
indicative for some conditions.10 Examples in the UK Na-
tional Health Service (NHS) include QRisk3,17 QCancer,18
and Cancer risk assessment tools (RATs),19 for which there
is evidence of acceptability and positive effect on referral
rates.20
Computerized decision support offers benefits over paper-
based alternatives through automation, consideration of all
data in the patient’s electronic record, computing sug-
gestions faster than by hand, and providing the potential for
prompts at optimal points in the clinical pathway.21,22
Computerized decision support is often compared
against paper-based counterparts on the assumption that
the paper versions are a suitable gold standard. On the
contrary, a metaregression analysis of the effect of clinical
decision support on clinical performances of interest
suggested that computerized decision support was asso-
ciated with greater improvements compared with their non-
digital counterparts.23 As the COVID-19 pandemic accel-
erates the drive to digital healthcare systems, the persis-
tence of paper-based methods as the primary modality (as
opposed to as contingency) makes integration difficult and
compromises health system performance and thus the
safety of patients.
Regardless of its advantages, clinical decision-support
software is recognized as safety critical, which means
that errors in use can cause significant harm.24 However, as
noted in Miller’s25 2009 historical review, the history of
computer-aided, diagnostic, decision support makes little
to no mention of a safety perspective. Decision-support
software can be inappropriately ad hoc in its
development,24 which has prompted regulation and ac-
creditation in different parts of the world including Europe,
with, for example, the Medical Device Directive,26 Con-
formité Européenne (CE) marking,3 and the Medical Device
Regulation (MDR).27 An introductory guide can be found in
Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency: An
Introductory Guide to the Medical Device Regulation
(MDR) and the In Vitro Diagnostic Medical Device Regu-
lation (IVDR).28 Although progress has been made in the
creation of methods for software development, like Disci-
pline Agile Delivery,29,30 the focus has been on the technical
performance given initial requirement specifications that do
not always include safety. This is despite calls from as far
back in the 1980s for an acceptable safety level to be
designed into software systems before actual production or
operation.31
Standards and Regulations for Clinical Decision-
Support Systems
Reviews and summaries of some regulations have been
conducted,32 but the safety implications of clinical decision
tools like symptom checkers are still underappreciated.33 In
the European Union, the Medical Device Directive specifies
classifications for different levels of regulation, essential
requirements for each level, and conformity routes for
medical devices.26 It was due for a replacement with the
MDR in 2020, but this deadline was extended to 2021
because of the COVID-19 pandemic.34 The intended im-
provements of the MDR included postmarket surveillance,
registration databases of devices and independent
accreditors, unique device identification, novel device
classifications (notably for software), and additional evi-
dence requirements. Notably, the MDR regulates medical
devices but does not specify standards.35
No single standard sufficiently covers the scope of clinical
decision-support systems. Helpfully, Chadwick et al36
summarize the relevant standards in their review and in-
troduction to IEC 61508.37 The IEC 61508 is a standard
suggested by the International Electrotechnical Commis-
sion (IEC) that describes methods for designing, deploying,
and maintaining automatic protection systems. Chadwick
et al36 argue that IEC 61508 is the most appropriate
standard to reference when considering any medical de-
vice software because of its safety and systems perspective.
CONTEXT
Key Objective
To present a patient safety and system-based perspective on current and proposed regulations for software as a medical
device, via a case study of a decision-support tool for cancer risk assessment in primary care.
Knowledge Generated
Current and proposed standards and regulations do not recognize health care and healthcare technologies as the complex
adaptive systems that they are. Patient safety is threatened by not acknowledging emergent consequences, favoring one-
shot approval processes, and bias toward loss-transfer approaches to risk management.
Relevance
Our nine recommendations provide practical and theoretical guidance to clinicians, decision makers in healthcare orga-
nizations, policy makers, and developers and regulators of health information technologies. Patient safety can be cultivated
and promoted if all those involved in healthcare systems acknowledge and act on their systemic influences and capabilities.
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In the United Kingdom, where this research was con-
ducted, specific standards include DCB012938 for health
system suppliers and DCB016039 for health service orga-
nizations, both developed for the UK NHS by the NHS
Digital Clinical Safety Group. Other relevant standards are
the International Organization for Standardization (ISO)
14971:2012, which details the internationally harmonized
medical device risk management standard that covers
general medical device development, but not software; the
IEC Technical Report (IEC/TR) 80002-1:2009, which
provides guidance on the application of ISO 14971 to
medical device software; and IEC 62304:2006, which
outlines the principles of software safety classification and
software lifecycle for medical devices.
Although these standards are available, they are not
compulsory. In the European Union’s MDR, CE marking is
the requirement for devices that go into service, whether or
not they go to market (Sec. 2 Art.52(2)27). CE marking is a
declaration by a manufacturer, indicating that they take
responsibility for the conformity of the product with the
essential requirements of the relevant European health,
safety, and environmental protection legislation.26 As noted
by Altenstetter,35 it “serves as a kind of market authorization
but should not be confused with premarket approval of
individual products, or with the strict product testing regime
operative in the pharmaceutical sector.” Shortcomings of
CE marking have been explained elsewhere noting, for
example, that the product can be tested for safety without
being tested for effectiveness.40 The following safety-
specific criticisms of CE marking are worth noting (for
more details, see refs. 35,41):
• Manufacturers do not need to provide instructions for
safe use if they believe that the device can be used safely
without instructions (Annex I Chapter III § 23.1.d27). This
places the responsibility of safety assessment, risk as-
sessment, and risk control in the hands of the manu-
facturer who might not have sufficient knowledge or
capacity to do so and who has competing financial
incentives;42
• The classification rules should be based on the intended
use of the device (Annex VIII Chapter II ¶ 3.127), which
does not acknowledge harm that might arise from
misuse—one of the three suggested domains of health
information-technology safety;43
• The classification rules should be applied separately to
devices that are intended to be used in combination
(Annex VIII Chapter II ¶ 3.227), which does not consider
the unknown behaviors that can emerge when health-
care information technologies combine to form health
information systems.44,45
The greatest concern is that these safety insufficiencies
relate to all classifications, including class I, which has the
least oversight and requirements (Annex VIII Chapter III27).
Manufacturers can accredit their own devices as class I,
needing only to make available for possible inspection a
technical file detailing a self-determined assessment of
conformity to standards. There is a danger that manu-
facturers of class I devices do not consider the more-
advanced standards discussed previously and put prod-
ucts to market that are not sufficiently safe for patients,
albeit they conform to regulations. Any self-certification or
other less-stringent route to approval runs the risk of misuse
or abuse at the cost of patient safety. For example, the
review by Zuckerman et al46 on device recalls in the United
States showed 71% of recalls were for devices approved via
the route that did not require clinical trials or manufacturer
inspections of safety or efficacy (see ref. 47 for discussion of
differences between European Union and US systems, at
the time).
A further complication is when software is developed for
exclusive use within particular health service organizations,
which is associated with its own lesser regulation in the
United Kingdom.48 Finally, decision-support software can
sit within or on top of an electronic healthcare record with
the best intentions of integration in mind. In such cases, the
boundaries of legal responsibility and of what constitutes
new or existing software are unclear. Examples of software
include STarT BACK, a back pain RAT integrated into an
electronic health record system,49 and BMJ Informatica’s
implementation of Hamilton’s19 Cancer RAT, which inter-
faces with the electronic health record system.13
In a previous paper in this journal, we described the de-
velopment of a clinical decision-support tool with a focus on
usability and clinical utility.30 In this paper, we take a patient
safety perspective to describe a case study of the devel-
opment of a computerized, clinical decision-support sys-
tem for cancer risk assessment embedded within an
electronic health record system. As a class I medical de-
vice, the tool requires minimal consideration for patient
safety despite influencing clinical decisions that, while not
therapeutic nor diagnostic, nevertheless affect patient care
and their journey through the health system. We argue that
current European regulations are insufficient for facilitating
safe development of healthcare information technology.
Our intention is to share our experience to support




The risk assessment system we implemented was a
computerization of Hamilton’s cancer RATs from the
CAncer Prevention in ExetER (CAPER) studies (Fig 1A).
There is strong case for computerization of Hamilton’s
cancer RATs because these studies identified features
associated with subsequent cancer diagnosis that was
clinically coded within patients’ electronic health records.19
The computerization also facilitates distribution of the tool
through the UK primary care software systems, which can
normalize and automate symptom detection.
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The English NHS has approved four electronic health re-
cord systems for use in primary care, and these have 100%
adoption with the three dominant systems being The
Phoenix Partnership (TPP) SystmOne, EMIS, and Vision.
CAPER RATs have been computerized by Macmillan
Cancer Support into Vision and EMIS Health systems50; Our
case study reports on development within SystmOne.51 The
Macmillan Cancer Support implementations covered lung
cancer and colorectal cancer, whereas our work included
bladder,52 colorectal,53 kidney,54 lung,55 esophagogastric,56
and ovarian cancers.57 We did not implement the audit-
table function available in the Macmillan Cancer Support
implementations but did implement in-consultation
prompts and an interactive symptom checker. The in-
consultation prompt is an automated function that com-
puted and presented a patient’s CAPER RAT score for each
cancer when the patient’s record was retrieved at the start of
the consultation. The symptom checker was a clinician-
selected form that structures a patient discussion on other
potentially relevant symptoms to compute aCAPERRAT score.
We began by assessing the feasibility of creating the






























































































0.40 0.94 2.40 1.20 1.10 1.10 1.50 0.97 2.30
PPV as a single
symptom
0.81 1.10 2.40 3.00 1.50 1.70 2.60 1.20 2.60 Constipation
1.50 3.40 3.10 1.90 2.40 11.0 2.20 2.90 Diarrhoea
6.80 4.70 3.10 4.50 8.50 3.60 3.20 Rectal bleeding
1.40 3.40 6.40 7.40 1.30 4.70 Loss of weight
3.00 1.40 3.30 2.20 6.90 Abdominal pain





The tool suggests the following “risk” scores:
Lung
Ovarian
Any scores > 2% = Moderate Risk   (suggest a referral of review of symptoms)
Would you like to make a Referral or use the Symptom Checker
tool to gather more information?






The Cancer Decision Support Tool
Referral Use Symptom Checker Tool Close Pause
Question
B
FIG 1. (A) Adaption of the paper-based
CAPER colorectal risk assessment tool (ap-
proved by original authors). (B) Screenshot of
the eRAT prompt that is automatically gen-
erated when a consultation has begun or
generated on demand by the user. CAPER,
CAncer Prevention in ExetER; eRAT, elec-
tronic-RAT.
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SystmOne offers functionality to users for triggering auto-
mated protocols, developing e-forms to collect data, and
defining bespoke clinical reports. It proved to be feasible to
develop a prototype system using automated protocols to
calculate an RAT score by processing bespoke clinical
reports that queried a patient’s records for symptoms
(Fig 1B). It was also feasible to build a Symptom Checker
e-form for focusing consultations.
Such a system would be considered a class 1 medical
device as per the MDR because it is a noninvasive device
(Annex VIII Chapter III ¶ 4.1Rule 1) that, although an active
device (Art. 2[4]), is not intended to take decisions with
diagnosis or therapeutic purposes (Annex VIII Chapter III ¶
6.3 Rule 11). The requirements for a class 1 device are
shown in Table 1.27
In the interests of maintaining a patient safety perspective,
we will focus discussions on the General Safety and Per-
formance Requirements and Benefit-Risk Analysis and
Risk Management as described in Annex 1 and 2 of the
MDR. Much of the requirements can be summarized within
our software development lifecycle (Fig 2). We iterated the
first three stages of the software development lifecycle to
incorporate insight gained from attempted builds and on-
going communication with TPP and a consultant in MDR
(author B.S.). For risk management, we integrated ele-
ments of ISO 14971:2012, IEC/TR 80002-1:2009, and IEC
62304:2006, as described in the introduction. We deemed
our risk management planning to be compliant with ISO
13485:2016, ISO 14971:2012, IEC/TR 80002-1:2009,
DCB0129:2018, IEC 62304:2006 Amd 1:2015, and BS EN
62366-1:2015.
Reflections
One-shot deal versus gradual reciprocity. Our iterative
development approach prompted reflection on the safety
standards and regulations. We noted that current regula-
tions offer a one-shot deal wherein manufacturers are
judged on a finished product produced by following self-
determined standards. If the device fails review, the
manufacture must restart product development. This is
costly for manufacturers, which likely both discourages
innovation and hinders learning. Gradual and reciprocal
development and safety review might be preferable to
encourage manufacturer engagement and integration of
safety into device development.
Hazard of assuming benignity. Manufacturers’ self-
classification of devices’ safety class is fundamental to
the MDR. The safety classification rules in the MDR dili-
gently classify devices that are expected to be potentially
harmful and classify other devices with lesser concern. The
implicit bias toward known hazards over unknown ones
falls prey to the potential for emergent harm that, by def-
inition, cannot be predicted (or are at least difficult to
predict precisely). As a complex system, healthcare pro-
vision and regulation operate with a prediction horizon.58
Far from ignoring or downplaying the events beyond this
horizon, regulators should endeavor to prepare for such
events as best as they can, similar to how they currently
request manufacturers to foresee and prepare for conse-
quences of a device’s use. The extreme alternative to Rule
13 (ie, all other active devices are classified as class I) is to
say that all devices that are not classified with previous rules
must be subject to review by the Notified Body. From the
latter perspective, the unknown is approached with caution
rather than assumed benignity.
Bias toward loss transfer. We also note that the regulations
and standards have an unbalanced approach to loss as-
sessment, loss control, and loss transfer. As noted by
Chadwick et al,36 standards like IEC 80001 are welcomed
for their systemic consideration of information technology
networks rather than isolated medical devices. However,
IEC 80001 suggests that hospitals are solely responsible for
the shared system configurations that they use, regardless
of what options are available. This framework invites the
well-known safety science criticisms of responsibility
structures, wherein those downstream in the resource-to-
delivery pipeline are responsible for harms that might have
their origin as upstream hazards.59,60 Such responsibility
structures lend themselves to focusing safety efforts at the
TABLE 1. Requirements for Class 1 Medical Devices Stipulated by the Medical Device Regulations
Annex 2 1. Device description and specification.
Technical documentation 2. Information to be supplied by the manufacturer.
3. Design and manufacturing information.
4. General safety and performance requirements.
5. Benefit-risk analysis and risk management plan.
6. Documentation in support of all verifications and validations that demonstrate conformity.
Annex 3 1. Postmarket surveillance plan.
Technical documentation on postmarket surveillance 2. Postmarket surveillance report.
Annex 4 1. European Union declaration of conformity
European Union declaration of conformity
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sharp end of systems rather than further back in the causal
chain.
For example, CE marking does not evidence the safety of
a device so much as it evidences that a legal entity (the
manufacturer) takes responsibility for adherence to
safety regulations. Although the intention might be to
encourage the legal entity to minimize the risk of harm
potentially caused by the product, a simpler solution to
adherence can be reached with an insurance model for
handling risk, which is part of a loss-transfer approach.
Such an approach attempts to manage the fallout of
harm instead of upstream mitigation of hazards be-
coming harm.
To illustrate the incoherence between safety and loss-
transfer approaches, consider insurance premiums for
drivers. Premiums are an attempt to cover the costs of
road traffic accidents but do not attempt to influence the
risk of accidents, which is the product of likelihood and
the magnitude of harm.61 On the other hand, speed
limits attempt to decrease the likelihood of accidents
occurring and have been shown to influence the risk of
road traffic accidents.62 Thus, speed limits facilitate
safety by addressing the harm-generating process fur-
ther back in the causal chain, which is the intention
behind the risk management planning requirements of
CE marking.
The loss-transfer approach might be used when the like-
lihood of harm is low, but the magnitude is high, and when
the use of resources is valued using short- and medium-
term perspectives.63 This tactic is likely due to a misun-
derstanding of probability that interprets a low-probability
event as the one that will not happen until the distant future,
as opposed to the one that can happen at any time.64,65
When combined with humans’ tendency for temporal
discounting,66 the choice is made to endure the harm of low
likelihood-high magnitude events in the future rather than
mitigating them at present. Commercial entities with suf-
ficient collateral can absorb the consequences of safety
risks by playing the odds while a product earns in the
market. On the contrary, it is more difficult to get products to
market with patient safety insights from patient caregivers
and safety researchers because existing regulations are not
primarily designed for clinical and academic institutions to
lead on development. The presence of a commercial bias
was evidenced by a 2020 study showing that the public
discourse around a regulatory framework for software as a
medical device proposed by US Food and Drug Admin-
istration lacked scientific support and commonly involved
undisclosed financial ties with industry.67
Despite these criticisms, loss-transfer approaches are ra-
tional choices when it is more difficult to predict the be-
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FIG 2. Software development lifecycle with five stages (S1-S5), each involving tasks (T1-T10) that produce outputs (O1-O20). Red nodes indicate tasks
not undertaken as part of this exploratory development study.
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undesirable consequences. A dynamic approach to risk
management that acknowledges a prediction horizon,
multiple levels, dependencies, and adaptations is thus
needed.68 The loss-transfer approach has been useful for
handling harm but ultimately should only be considered a
stopgap while we improve our understanding of harm-
generating processes in the healthcare systems.
PATIENT SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS
Our experience of developing a computerized clinical
decision-support system provided insight into the potential
threats to patient safety inherent in the regulation of
medical devices. Table 2 presents nine recommendations
to address our identified concerns and the expected im-
provements for patient safety.
Beginning with perhaps the most practicable suggestion,
we recommend an explicit rather than implicit definition of
class 1 devices, which could be managed by notified
bodies [recommendation 1]. As noted in earlier reflections,
classification of class 1 devices is implied when not covered
by predetermined hazards. An alternative is for unclassified
devices to be subject to review by the Notified Body.
A second practicable suggestion is for explicit harmonized
regulation of devices developed in-house [recommendation
2]. There is intentional lack of regulatory requirements for
medical devices developed in-house that assumes regula-
tions should not apply to devices “used only within health
institutions…that support the healthcare system and/or
address patient needs…since the aims of this Regula-
tion would still be met in a proportionate manner.” 27(p5)
Although we do not doubt healthcare institution’s commit-
ment to patient safety, there is concern about competing
incentives, less-stringent national regulations,48 and lack of
knowledge and experience evaluating safety of medical
devices.
It is already accepted by the clinical academic community
that the regulation of medical devices is unfit to protect
patients against harm, with thwarted calls for medical
devices to be regulated like pharmaceuticals.69 At first
glance, it might seem to be preferable to adopt the more
stringent regulatory frameworks used by the European
Medicines Agency. These frameworks take a strong
Safety-1 approach, which is more concerned with mini-
mizing false negatives than it is about promoting true
positives,70 in other words, stopping unsafe and ineffective
devices getting to market even at the expense of hindering
access to safe and effective devices. But the rapid in-
novation of medical devices does not lend itself well to
such prolonged evaluations. The Safety-2 paradigm of
Hollnagel et al,70 however, focuses on promoting
TABLE 2. Summary of Recommendations to Address the Safety Concerns Raised. Expected Improvements to Patient Safety Are Also Provided
No. Recommendation General Concern Being Addressed Patient Safety Improvement
1 Involve notified body in regulation
of Class 1 devices
Classification of Class 1 devices is implicit if not covered by
predetermined hazards and is not checked by notified bodies, so
they might be inappropriately less scrutinised.
Greater opportunity for appropriate
classification of risk.
2 Explicit harmonized regulation of
devices developed in-house
Insufficient expertise and guidance. Holistic and integrated approach to
device development.
3 Safety-2 perspective of risk Over focus on stopping things going wrong at the risk of hindering
innovation
Patients avail of manageably risky
innovations.
4 Gradual approval of medical
devices (eg, IDEAL framework)
Current regulation cannot handle incremental rollout and
development, which are cornerstones of software and needed for
cautious evaluation of emergent behavior.
Manageably increased sensitivity to
safety concerns during evaluation.
5 Risk-sharing approach Responsibility for risk mitigation is solely on the manufacturer despite
the fact that the safe development and use of devices involve
multiple stakeholders. Also, loss-transfer approaches like insurance
inevitably discourage innovators with less financial collateral.
Broad and less-biased concept of risk.
6 Realign standards and regulations Current regulations are decoupled from standards, which permits
gaming to expedite product to market.
Constraints on perverse actions.
7 Systems approach to
conceptualizing risk
Current regulation is biased toward handling known harms despite the
complex nature of healthcare, meaning that some harms are
emergent. Also, risk classification is separate for components
intended to be used together, which ignores the potential for
emergent harms from interactions.
Increased sensitivity to emergent
threats to patient safety.
8 Systems approach to patient safety Current regulation does not conceptualize health care as a complex
system so the underlying conception of patient safety is inaccurate.
Better understanding of what the
structure of patient safety might be.
9 Systems model of accidents Current regulation does not conceptualize health care as a complex
system so the underlying conception of causation is inaccurate.
Better understanding of what the
mechanism of harm generation
might be.
Abbreviation: IDEAL, Idea-Development-Exploration-Assessment-Long.
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processes that lead to safe performance despite the
presence of hazard, by dynamically reflecting and
adjusting performance.71 Future regulations could benefit
from adopting a Safety-2 approach to their design [rec-
ommendation 3].
Computerized decision-support systems are complex in-
terventions and should be evaluated as such.22 Nieu-
wenhuijse et al72 suggest a regulatory approach
reminiscent of Safety-2 by requiring controlled and
evidence-based introductions of device innovations to
safely handle upgrades, in their case, to orthopedicmedical
implants. This is one approach to regulate incremental
innovation in medical devices, of which the development of
software-within-software could be considered an
example.73 On a similar vein, the Idea-Development-
Exploration-Assessment-Long-term framework champions
gradual approval of medical devices rather than the one-
shot approval of CE marking, which would allow graded,
responsible, but earlier patient access.74,75 In the United
States, the Software Pre-Cert Pilot Program focuses on the
digital health technology developer rather than the product
to support streamlined premarket review and learning from
use in the market.76 Such frameworks address the concern
that the increased administrative burden of more stringent
regulations might delay products that are imperfect but
practically useful [recommendation 4].77
With respect to standards, we encourage risk sharing ap-
proaches, as promoted by ISO 31000 [recommendation
5].63 Such approaches distribute loss assessment, loss
control, and loss transfer over all stakeholders at the cost of
more complicated relationships between producers, pro-
viders, and users. This increased complicatedness of re-
lationships will require resources, but such expense should
be seen as an investment in improved system performance,
rather than an inconvenience.
If not risk sharing, at least an alternative to predominantly
loss-transfer approaches would be an increase in the focus
of loss-control approaches like risk mitigation.78 These
approaches are the second of three elements of a thorough
risk management strategy for patient safety.79 Although
design control and risk management are explicitly men-
tioned in standards like ISO 13485, risk control is not
explicitly mandated. Realignment of law and technical
standards in the European Union might be required to
facilitate this [recommendation 6].35
Of course, loss-control approaches are insufficient on their
own. Health care is inherently risky and must approach
safety by concurrently avoiding, managing, and embracing
risk, depending on which of its range of services it is
providing.80 Although regulation contributes to the avoidance
and management of risk, it is not well-placed to help with
embracing risk, which requires adaptive processes within
the healthcare systems.80 The proposed solution is for actors
in such an environment or system to rely on personal (rather
than system) judgment, adaptability, and resilience.
On the theme of complex systems, ISO 14971 recom-
mends proactive identification and mitigation of hazards,
which assumes at least an approximately deterministic
system in which hazards and harms can be foreseen.
Health care, however, is a complex adaptive system whose
behavior can be emergent, nonlinear, and intractable to
predict at arbitrary horizons.81 An alternative system–based
approach to conceptualizing risk is required to appropri-
ately reflect the systems being regulated [recommendation
7],42 which should be complemented by system-based
approaches to patient safety [recommendation 8]82 and
models of accidents,83 eg, Levenson’s System-Theoretic
model [recommendation 9].84
Criticisms of the European Union’s MDD41 have partly been
addressed in the impending MDR. It has become in-
creasingly apparent, however, that existing regulation of
medical devices is insufficient for the digital age85 and there
are difficulties inherent in reaching global coherence.86 In
this article, we argue that regulations in the European Union
do not sufficiently address the complexity of healthcare
information systems with consequences for patients’ safety.
Advocates for digital health care tout its speed, coverage,
and capacity but perhaps without considering its own suite
of challenges. Future development of regulations should
make it easier for clinical and academic institutions to produce
healthcare information technology so that they contribute their
patient care and safety science insights. Finally, future de-
velopment of standards should continue to follow a system-
based view to risk of healthcare information technology.42
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